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Abstract 
It is widely acknowledged within the risk literature that the mass media play a pivotal role in 
shaping information about risk events for audiences. Whilst some risk events reflect 
occurrences specific to particular times and locations, other risk events are more difficult to 
temporally and spatially situate as they are dispersed across years or months and are not 
constrained to particular geographic locations. Studies examining the relationship between the 
social amplification or attenuation of risks and their framing in the media have tended to focus 
on the former type of event. In this paper we explore the social amplification of risk in relation 
to ash dieback disease (Hymenoscyphus fraxineus), a tree health issue that attracted intense 
media attention in the UK in 2012, and characterise what we designate as a dispersed risk event. 
Drawing on the influential Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), we present a 
frame analysis of UK national newspaper articles to assess the connection between media 
coverage of dieback and risk amplification, and the extent to which dieback coverage drew on 
other tree health issues and objects of media attention. Focusing particularly on the blame frame 
around dieback, the paper considers the implications of conceptualising dispersed risk events 
for the SARF and its amplification metaphor. Moreover, given that risk events such as dieback 
are often associated with policy shifts, we suggest that there is value for risk communicators 
and policy makers in broadening their focus to incorporate more of the ‘history’ of risk events 
in order to anticipate likely anchors of public and media attention. 
 Social Amplification of Risk Framework, risk event, frame analysis, media, ash dieback. 
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Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, one of the most comprehensive tools available for exploring the 
relationships between media representation, risk communication and the social and individual 
processes involved in the perception of risk has been the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al. 1988; Renn et al. 1992; Rosa 2003). SARF’s core thesis 
is that events related to hazards, communicated via channels such as the media, interact with 
psychological, social and cultural processes in ways that can intensify or attenuate the public 
perception of risk, subsequently shaping and influencing risk behaviour (Renn 1991). 
According to SARF, risk signals can become amplified through social processes to an extent 
that the public perception and response to a specific risk diverges from expert assessments 
(Kasperson et al. 1988). Such processes may have potentially deleterious secondary and 
tertiary effects, or ‘ripples’ (Sutton and Veil 2017).  
SARF ascribes the mass media a ‘pivotal role as a “station” relaying “signals” and constructing 
public representations of risk’ (Murdock et al. 2003, p. 156); i.e. the salience of messages can 
be actively enhanced as they are filtered through the media, alongside an increase or decrease 
in the volume and nature of information available (Pidgeon and Barnett 2013). It has long been 
recognised that the mass media are central players in constructing and disseminating 
information and knowledge about risk to the public (Kitzinger 1999; Tulloch and Zinn 2011). 
The mass media has traditionally been viewed as the primary source of information that the 
public have about risks (Beck 2009) and the most important source with regard to 
environmental issues (Bengston and Fan 1999). Hence, the media frame how risks are made 
salient (Petts et al. 2001) and shape risk perception (Allan et al. 2010). According to Entman 
(1993, issue framing in the media performs four interrelated functions: defining problems, 
diagnosing the causes, and making moral judgements about the causes and suggesting 
remedies. These functions are most often connected to common cultural values and anchors, 
and composed of both framing and reasoning devices (Gamson 1988; Van Gorp 2007). The 
concept of frames is useful for drawing attention to the way in which the media shapes news 
items in terms of latent meaning structures (Van Gorp 2005), and directs attention to how latent 
meaning is invariably rooted in, and hence invokes, a broader, historical field of events. 
Rendering the historical field visible and exploring how representations of previous events are 
used to substantiate the existence and nature of current issues is a crucial step toward bringing 
SARF ‘in line’ with a contemporary media. This technologically dependent and complex media 
is radically different from when SARF was originally conceived (Sutton and Veil 2017) and 
facilitates, if not necessitates, reflecting on how contemporary journalistic practices are 
increasingly entangled with social media content. By its nature, social media means that past 
events and historical occurrences are always available to be drawn on to make sense of the 
present. Hence, understanding the ways in which the historical field is made present better 
enables communicators and policymakers to anticipate likely configurations of public and 
media attention. 
While acknowledging the complexity of relations between both the psychological and social 
processes and the various actors which SARF considers, a ‘risk event’ is generally depicted as 
the start of the social amplification process; e.g. an accident or recognition of adverse effect 
(Renn et al. 1992).  Indeed, the originators make clear in their response to initial critiques of 
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SARF that ‘the amplification process […] starts with either a physical event […] or a report of 
environmental or technological events…’ (Kasperson 1992, p. 159). Whilst they acknowledge 
that ‘social processes may transform, reconfigure or “reinvent” the [risk event, without altering 
the magnitude of its consequence]’ (ibid. 164), this contention remains undeveloped. 
Moreover, while some risk events have been considered as occurrences specific to particular 
times and locations (Driedger 2007; Kasperson et al. 1988), others are more difficult to locate 
both temporally or spatially. Instead, they take place across years or months and may involve 
multiple geographic locations. A factory explosion may be characterised in the former sense 
because it occurs across a short time span, is geographically localised and with a discrete and 
local population experiencing its immediate effects. In contrast, some events are less 
determinate, being socially and geographically dispersed and temporally protracted or even 
cyclical, e.g. ‘environmental risk events’ such as seasonal dengue fever or smoke haze (Ng et 
al. 2017). Prior to these events occurring, the risks remain latent. It is thus useful to consider 
what has to occur for these risks to become salient such that they have ‘eventness’ conferred 
on them (O'Carroll 2015). One might argue that the media is a crucial factor in this process. 
Given that the interplay of media and experience is complex and co-constitutive (Davis 2017), 
the media response actually becomes part of the event it reports on. Hence, establishing the 
boundaries of an event is somewhat arbitrary. According to  (Žižek 2014), it is difficult if not 
impossible to differentiate the cause from the effect leading to the ascription of something as 
an ‘event’. The authors of SARF have noted that the concept of an initiating event does not 
imply that a baseline of true risk exists; that ‘risk is conceptualized partly as a social construct 
and partly as an objective property of a hazard or event’ (Renn et al. 1992, p. 140). However, 
this explanation does not clarify how the subjective and objective properties of risk coincide 
such that ‘eventness’ can be conferred. More prosaically, where or what are the boundaries of 
an event and where does it begin and end temporally, spatially and in terms of its effects?  
Studies employing SARF to explore risk perception have tended to focus on ‘discrete’ events, 
e.g. hazardous waste spillages and train wrecks (Kasperson et al. 1988), rather than on 
occurrences that are diffuse, always-already historically rooted and that define a recursive and 
open, fluid [social] object (Mol and Law 1994). In this paper we characterise such occurrences 
as dispersed events. Bringing this notion to SARF, while ripple effects, for example, are seen 
as a consequence of the event, they are neither seen in a recursive sense, nor as historically 
retroactive; i.e. always rooted in and emanating from points in the past and always reshaping 
that past as they ripple forward. Those studies that have attended to the history of an event tend 
to focus on similar occurrences of a type, exploring for example the manner in which risk 
perceptions around oil spills become anchored with specific occurrences (Leschine 2002), or 
time-series analyses of how newspaper attention to flu affects public reaction (Trumbo 2012). 
Hence, if some risk events are better thought of as dispersed, what are the implications for 
SARF and its application? 
Aims 
Situating our analysis in relation to SARF, the aim of this paper is to explore the notion of what 
we describe as a dispersed risk event around ash dieback disease, Hymenoscyphus fraxineus1 
in the UK, and its emergence as an object of media attention in 2012. We assess the connection 
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between traditional media coverage of dieback and the extent to which that coverage drew on 
a broader and historical field of other issues and objects.  
The paper unfolds as follows: First, we outline dieback, describing the trajectory and nature of 
media attention it garnered. Next, we reflect on dieback and its status as an event. We then 
outline our empirical work, a frame analysis of UK national newspaper articles, to situate 
dieback in relation to a broader and historical field of how the media have reported on other 
tree health issues in the UK. We argue that previous tree diseases are precursors of the way in 
which dieback was represented in the media in the sense that they were invoked in the reporting 
of dieback to warrant particular points. We highlight the salience of questions of ‘blame’ and 
their entanglement with dieback and other tree issues to outline the importance of exploring 
how contemporary understandings of risk events reveal and re-present historical concerns. We 
suggest that the visibility of the blame frame around dieback was in-part established by virtue 
of previous events being enrolled. Dieback is not only presented in a discourse of being ‘the 
latest in a long line’, but with the mismanagement of government as being the ‘reason’ why 
this long line continues. Finally, we reflect on the implications for SARF of considering 
dispersed risk events. 
Ash dieback disease in the UK 
Ash dieback disease, first observed in Poland in the 1990s (Needham et al. 2016) and  
subsequently spreading widely in Europe, was first discovered in the UK in a Buckinghamshire 
nursery in February 2012. It had arrived from the Netherlands on a batch of imported ash 
saplings (Urquhart et al. 2017). H. fraxineus had not been identified until 2006 (Timmermann 
et al. 2011)2. Later in 2012, H. Fraxineus was found in the wider environment in East England. 
Media attention to dieback in late 2012 was intense and attributed by some commentators as a 
significant driver behind the subsequent government response (Heuch 2014), and responsible 
for tree health becoming a major public concern (Woodward and Boa 2013). Whether we view 
risk as an objective property of the world, separate from our perception, or as a subjective 
reflection of the uncertainty around potentially deleterious outcomes and events, the 
increasingly complex interactions between different actors makes measuring and defining risk 
problematic (Aven et al. 2011). Thus, whilst H. fraxineus can be construed as an objective 
agent of risk, dieback as a risk event connotes a socially constructed state of affairs which 
draws in and on different actors and dimensions such as public and media attention, scientific 
knowledge and policy practice. 
According to (Tomlinson 2016), media attention to dieback comprised four distinct stages: the 
discovery of dieback and its representation by the media as a significant threat, its spread to 
the wider environment, government action including a major summit and survey to establish 
the range of dieback and, finally, acceptance that it was too late to prevent its spread or 
eradicate it. The first of these phases witnessed the apportioning of blame against the 
government and plant health authorities, primarily for failure to enact legislation mitigating 
against the import of dieback on ash stock (Fellenor et al. 2017; Tomlinson 2016). In the 
context of risk events, rhetorical and judicial framings and language are used to define the event 
and to allocate blame (Hart 1993). Blame is central to the political process (Hood 2008) and at 
a community level is a dominant form of explanation (Douglas 2003). How news is framed in 
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terms of blame and responsibility, influences how people make decisions about how to act with 
regard to social problems (Iyengar 1994). Thus, it is not surprising that blame became 
entangled with dieback in the media. 
From the SARF perspective, a risk event has certain features with the potential to ignite public 
concern. If we consider dieback as a risk event, it is useful to consider which of its features 
contributes to its event status. Risk signals are images, signs and symbols which constitute a 
text in such a way that a perception of risk evolves (Kasperson et al. 2003). The signal value 
of an event, i.e. what it foreshadows in terms of higher order impacts, systematically relates to 
characteristics such as its familiarity or novelty and how uncertain its consequences are 
(Kasperson et al. 1988). Signal value also relates to those features most likely to attract media 
attention (Pidgeon and Barnett 2013). These media triggers relate to, for example, blame, 
political conflict and the potential for widespread exposure to the risk. Such attributes are 
reflected in dieback’s ‘focal power derived from the perceived scale and nature of its impact, 
the initial attribution of blame on the government, the government’s war-like response, and 
ash’s status as a threatened native tree ’ (Tomlinson 2016, p. 174). 
Consideration of the way in which prior events affects future understanding of risk is usefully 
informed by Barnett and Breakwell (2003) work on the ‘hazard sequence’. The premise is that 
notifications about a risk or hazard, such as a government statement or media coverage, do not 
occur in isolation but instead involve a temporal sequence of related instances; i.e. a hazard 
sequence. The sequence of notifications about the hazard are made sense of in terms of existing 
‘hazard templates’; schema-like frameworks. A hazard template includes information about the 
hazard as well as the organisations and groups involved in managing it.  
Extrapolating the hazard sequence to the blame levelled at the government around dieback, the 
template with which blame was interpreted might involve negative attributions about the 
competence of the government to manage such problems, based on their track record. In this 
case, the preceding record included the abortive public forest sell-off but also long-standing 
policies. Knowledge of the hazard template can therefore sensitise risk communicators to how 
subsequent notifications might be anchored and will be ‘indicative of the potential for risk 
amplification’ (ibid. 305).  Analysing the broader historical field around risk events and how 
they are framed enhances how we understand the evolution of risk amplification. The hazard 
sequence goes some way down this path. We seek to extend this by exploring not only how the 
dieback event was constituted in the media with reference to historical tree health issues but  
also, in doing so, how these issues were themselves re-presented in light of dieback.  
To recap and to formalise our aims, this paper addresses three questions: 
 What was written about dieback in the mass media and how was it framed? 
 How did dieback connect to historical tree-health and other issues in the media?  
 How were other tree health issues re-presented in light of dieback?  
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Methods 
Data collection 
Nexis3 was used to collect all UK national newspaper articles addressing dieback from their 
first appearance in late 2012 until 31 December 2015. As each article was read, instances of 
other salient and tree health issues were noted. Nexis was then used to collect all articles 
pertaining to these tree health issues from the date of their first appearance in UK national 
newspapers until 31 December 2015 (table 1).  All articles were retrieved in full as pdf files 
and also as headline only Excel spreadsheets, from which we were able to record article volume 
across time.  
Year Oak 
processionary 
moth 
(T. processionea) 
Phytophthora  
ramorum 
Ash dieback 
disease 
(H. 
fraxineus) 
Great spruce  
bark beetle  
(D. micans) 
Chestnut leaf 
miner  
(C. 
ohridella) 
Emerald ash 
borer  
(A. 
planipennis) 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 2 0 0 
2002 0 9 0 6 4 0 
2003 0 17 0 1 0 0 
2004 0 15 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 1 0 0 3 0 
2006 6 2 0 0 25 0 
2007 11 4 0 0 17 1 
2008 10 12 0 1 19 0 
2009 6 8 0 2 21 2 
2010 6 10 0 1 18 0 
2011 15 16 0 2 30 1 
2012 36 (22) 46 (34) 507 10 (8) 35 (8)  5 (5) 
2013 32 22 216 0 18 7 
2014 23 2 38 2 9 1 
2015 0 10 64 3 4 9 
Total 145 174 825 30 203 26 
Table 1: Annual volume for selected tree pests and pathogens newspaper articles. Figures in brackets indicate 
articles including the selected pest/pathogen and dieback. 
Analytic approach 
Given our aim of discerning the media framing of dieback as a ‘dispersed’ risk event, we opted 
for a framing approach because it facilitates the interpretation of articles at the level of symbolic 
devices and patterns as a coherent textual infrastructure, rather than merely in terms of content 
(Hertog and McLeod 2001). Consideration of a text’s framing also enables consideration of the 
‘the complex interaction of texts with an active audience engaged in negotiating meaning’ 
(ibid. x). Drawing on the work of Gamson (1988), Entman (1993) and Van Gorp (2007), we 
developed a matrix which enabled identification of frame elements, comprised of (1) framing 
devices and (2) reasoning devices which deal with the justifications that account for such 
patterns (table 2). 
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                       Reasoning devices                                        Framing devices 
Problem (Causal) 
interpretation 
(Moral) 
evaluation 
Solution Metaphors Exemplars Catchphrases Depictions Visual 
images 
It is not 
clear 
how far 
dieback 
will 
spread. 
The lack of 
clarity of how 
far dieback 
will spread or 
how it got here 
leads to 
precautionary 
measures and 
the implication 
of specific 
vectors.  
When 
foresters 
condemn a 
tree as 
"past it", 
they are 
thinking 
about its 
timber 
value, not 
its biology. 
Despite 
uncertainty 
with the 
vector of 
spread, “a 
ban on the 
import of 
ash trees 
will combat 
the threat 
of dieback” 
The slow 
poisoning of 
a landscape 
left 
undefended 
by 
Government 
and 
complacency. 
10 cases of 
the disease 
were 
confirmed 
in East 
Anglia 
Ashmageddon Disease 
which killed 
90% of 
Danish ash 
trees is 
found to 
have spread 
to British 
countryside. 
Image 
of a 
healthy 
ash 
tree in 
a field 
of rape 
Table 2: Frame matrix with exemplars (relating to a range of pests and diseases) extracted from media items. 
With an initial focus on dieback, we extracted all textual elements that matched the devices in 
our framing matrix. This involved iterative reading of articles in chronological order, adopting 
a thematic-analytic style in that as we moved through the data and encountered new framing 
elements we would return to previous articles to ensure that we had not overlooked these, 
mirroring the iterative approach used to check codes. We then adopted the same approach, 
using the framing matrix, to extract relevant elements from all other tree heath articles.  
To determine the most prolific frames, we assessed each column in our matrices in terms of 
the most frequent elements, summarising these in our own words. This facilitated the 
recognition of substantial shifts in frame across time. Some frame elements cluster together 
systematically in a specific manner, forming a pattern that can be identified across several texts 
in a sample (Kohring and Matthes 2002; Matthes 2009; Matthes and Kohring 2008). Hence, 
we also noted if matrix elements clustered together and, if so, gathered them together under a 
key descriptor such as ‘blame’, ‘spread’ and so forth and which could be discussed in a descriptive 
manner.  
Results and discussion 
Media attention to dieback during the peak period and key insights 
Nexis returned 825 national newspaper articles (figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Monthly number of dieback articles in British national newspapers January 2012 – December 2015. 
Articles about dieback first appeared in June 2012; five in total. No articles appeared in July or 
August, and ten in September. The number increased dramatically through October, peaking 
on November 2nd. By November 18th, numbers were declining, averaging less than five per 
day. Of the five hundred and seven articles that appeared in 2012, two hundred and twenty 
occurred between late October and mid-November. Figure 2 illustrates the daily coverage for 
the peak period and indicates not only the rapid rise and fall in volume of stories about dieback 
but also the day-to-day ebb and flow. This is situated against significant government 
notifications and events relating to dieback.  
 
Figure 2. Daily number of dieback items in UK national newspapers and significant government 
action/notifications. 
 
Early articles presaged the threat of the disease, describing its spread throughout Europe, and 
raising the issue of tree pathogens in general; such references increased in number alongside, 
or as part of, dieback articles. The ‘relaxed’ nature of UK import policy was noted and a key 
feature was that in 2009 the Horticultural Trades Association (HTA) had written to the UK 
Government asking for a ban on ash imports, to no avail4. In early October, articles reported 
that an ash import ban was likely by early November, and yet it was over a month until this 
was finally effected. By late October, articles were establishing causal frames around ministers 
‘hiding’ behind EU laws to avoid imposing an earlier ban and, in relation to this, for example, 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was used to depict that EU countries could impose 
bans, as the French did to British beef during the BSE crisis. In late November it was reported 
that dieback in Ireland would affect production of hurleys. At this time, media interest had 
declined to a few articles per day apart from occasion spikes, e.g. in late December when it was 
reported that seventy thousand ash trees were imported and planted by the Forestry 
Commission (FC) after it was allegedly warned of the danger of the disease.  
Albeit there was some temporal overlap between frames, a trajectory of framing was 
discernible: where dieback would ‘spread’ and its potential effects, what could be done to 
eradicate or ‘fight’ it and finally that it was ‘too late’ to prevent the spread. The frame of 
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‘spread’ was essentially characterised by the uncertainties around where dieback would spread 
and how fast and coincided with uncertainties regarding whether the organism had arrived on 
imports or had been [wind] blown across the channel. In terms of individual frames, the frame 
of ‘fight’ against dieback included specific material action that had or could be taken, such as 
cutting and burning trees, setting up protected zones, using specific pesticides. These 
intersected with a metaphorical deployment of the ‘fight’ frame. In line with Joffe (2011), it 
might be suggested that the metaphorical deployment of the fight against dieback interacts with 
concrete action and is entangled with other metaphorical representations which were apparent. 
These included ‘invasion’ and the otherness implied by framing device catchphrases such as 
‘close the borders’ and depictions including Britain having a history of keeping out invaders. 
The significance of which is that it extends the framing of dieback by enrolling a wider field 
of issues. Eventually, the frame of ‘too late’ proliferated, i.e. that dieback would not be 
eradicated. 
From the outset dieback was anchored to Dutch elm disease (DED), a pathogen which, since 
an outbreak in the late 1960s, has killed most elm trees in the UK (Sansford 2013), with 
headlines in the run-up period to October 29th featuring emotive risk signals such as ‘killer’, 
‘disease’ and ‘spread’. These prefaced the depiction of spread the spread of ash dieback disease 
as inevitable, emphasising the consequences and underlining the extent to which the UK 
Government were already implicated in the problem.  
The peak of media attention coincided with a cluster of high profile events, such as the ash 
import ban, around the beginning of November. As some scholars suggest, heightened media 
attention to an issue often attracts greater policy attention at the start of the issue cycle (Downs 
2016). According to Hood (2007) governments demonstrate a ‘negativity bias’ in that negative 
attention, such as information about mismanaged affairs, produces greater impact on policy 
and resultant action than positive information. A sensitivity to negative media coverage and a 
reactive response to mitigate blame and maintain reputation can, potentially, lead to initial short 
term solutions and then longer term solutions as media attention fades (Yanovitzky 2002). This 
reflects what occurred with dieback, given, for example, the rapidity of the import ban after the 
onset of intense media attention and subsequent longer term policy changes affecting the plant 
health and biosecurity field, such as the UK plant health risk register (Baker et al. 2014).  
Given that dieback is associated with a shift in tree-health policy, it is important to think about 
this in an evolving media context. Some events, dieback amongst them, can assume iconic 
status in both the public and policy consciousness. The newsworthiness of a story reflects the 
need to produce impactful articles and also the values of the journalists and audiences (Hughes 
et al. 2006). The types of event which might not only have an immediate news value but also 
effect rapid policy shifts tend to incorporate media triggers and risk signals which connect, for 
instance, to harm which can be linked to specific casualties and hence to specific media 
audiences (Alaszewski and Brown 2011). These were largely absent with dieback, despite 
media headlines depicting catastrophe and so forth. Thus, whilst the SARF literature represent 
‘events’ in a relatively straightforward way, we suggest that they are better understood as 
composites of other [historical] issues. This understanding is appropriate for the tree-health 
policy-shifts attributed to dieback (Tomlinson 2016) given that ‘the proximate origin [of] 
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policy change varies from one case to the next […] when one starts to trace the history of a 
proposal or concern back through time, there is no logical place to stop the process’ (Kingdon 
2013, p. 73). Hence, of note was that as we moved through the trajectory of dieback, the decline 
in prominence of frames ostensibly about dieback per se, e.g. how to fight it, gave way to a 
more consistent concern with other tree health issues, the significance of which we now 
discuss.  
Other tree-health issues 
In relation to our second research question, how did dieback connect to historical tree-health 
and other issues in the media, we noted that articles often included references to other tree pests 
and pathogens (TPP), most frequently Oak processionary moth (Thaumetopoea processionea) 
(OPM)5, ramorum (Phytophthora ramorum)6, Horse chestnut leaf miner (Cameraria ohridella) 
(HCLM)7, Emerald ash borer (Agrilus planipennis) (EAB)8 and the Great spruce bark beetle 
(Dendroctonus micans) (GSBB)9. As illustrated previously in table 1, the number of articles 
per year for these TPP, pre-dieback, was low. During 2012, each separate TPP experienced a 
significant increase in number of articles; the exception being HCLM, which had demonstrated 
greater consistency since 2006 and hence a relatively moderate increase in 2012. Also, in 2012, 
Thirty four articles about dieback included ramorum and twenty two included OPM. DED 
appeared in one hundred and eighty eight articles in 2012, anchored with DED in one hundred 
and twenty five of these, but only twenty-seven in 2011. Media attention to HCLM increased 
in conjunction with the first appearance of OPM in the media in 2006 and then peaked with the 
later appearance of dieback, declining rapidly thereafter. The volume of articles about all TPP 
declined dramatically from 2013. Articles reporting dieback were also depicted with an ever-
expanding range of threats to the environment from animal and plant species, including the 
grey squirrel; an invasive species present in the UK since the early 1900s. Unlike other TPP, 
HCLM was included in relatively fewer articles with dieback in 2012. This may reflect its 
salience in its own right, in terms of recurrent articles about the loss of conkers, anchored in 
terms of Britain’s heritage of the game of conkers, and thereby making it of general interest, 
including other areas of media attention such as its suitability for citizen science campaigns 
(Pocock and Evans 2014).  
TPP were often cited to establish frames around dieback, for example ‘ash dieback is just one 
of the threats laying siege to Britain's trees’10. Not only did dieback articles enrol other tree 
pests and pathogens but the advent of dieback facilitated greater attention being paid to these 
other threats. It can be speculated that this reflects how media attention to an issue enhances 
the salience of similar issues and that media attention is usually transitory (Downs 2016; 
Kingdon 2013). Articles about other TPP proliferated in late 2012 because they served to 
establish broader frames through which dieback was reported, i.e. dieback was in part 
substantiated through these other pests and pathogens. Reference can be made here to the 
hazard template in that the template through which dieback was interpreted evolved from the 
framing of a tree health issue to one involving a broader existential threat.  
It could be argued that the proliferation of articles about other TPP was unrelated to dieback or 
involved the discovery of new outbreaks of each given threat. However, the content of articles 
suggest otherwise. For example, the earliest GSBB articles, in 2001, enrol the pest as exemplar 
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of one threat amongst many due to climate change. In 2002, all articles about GSBB represent 
its spread in the UK as necessitating timber movement restrictions. In subsequent GSBB 
articles these issues wax and wane. In 2012 GSBB articles rehearse similar framings as those 
from 2001 but with ash dieback added to the list of threats. Hence, not only can we conclude 
that the 2012 proliferation of media attention to GSBB was connected to dieback but also that 
the template for the broad threat of climate change and alien species existed at least ten years 
prior. Hence, the connections between dieback and other tree issues reflects (Pidgeon and 
Barnett 2013, p. 10) observation, with regard to SARF, that ‘understandings of dieback and its 
risks would not be developed in isolation and that it is useful to understand what other 
phenomena are being linked to and drawn upon [in its representation].’  
Unlike other risk events, such as earthquakes and floods, dieback did not hinge on a discrete 
high profile event. Instead, other tree issues were drawn on, suggesting their significance in 
anchoring dieback and that dieback was constructed from historical issues. Thus, the character 
of dieback as an ‘event’ is quite different from many other risk events. Its boundaries are 
blurred in the sense that if dieback was substantiated through these other pests and pathogens, 
we might be better placed thinking about it in terms of a risk that has been constituted from 
historical and latent issues. From the risk research perspective, this necessitates a 
reconsideration of the period across which an event occurs.  
In summary, other tree pests and pathogens were drawn on in media articles. As such, dieback 
as a risk event needs to be considered in terms of a broader and historical field. Such 
consideration shifts our focus away from proximal issues in a way that enables us to trace the 
evolution of dieback and how the broader domain of tree health came to be represented in the 
media. Given that blame was a significant frame around the emergence of dieback in 2012, in 
the following section we consider how this frame evolved and how other events in tree health 
were implicated. 
Blame 
In relation to the SARF, blame is an explicit aspect of how risk perception connects to media 
coverage of an event (Kasperson et al. 1992). If the nature of blame is influenced by existing 
events and states then it is useful to explore the historical trajectory along which blame evolves. 
Blame is a dominant media trope and, according to Alaszewski and Brown (2011, disastrous 
events have become increasingly important partly because of the need to apportion blame for 
the failure to identify and prevent risk. While dieback does not constitute a risk in the same 
way as an earthquake or flood, it did attract media attention in terms of who or what was to 
blame for its introduction to the UK and a significant aspect of this frame implicated the 
burgeoning global trade in plant material. Yet prior to the emergence of dieback in 2012, the 
global plant trade was already an object of media attention, for example, ‘Invasive species are 
finding their way to Britain in increasing numbers, largely because of the globalisation of the 
timber trade’11. An explicit moral framing of tree imports, i.e. ‘eco-disaster is inevitable if we 
import trees’12, was also apparent. Global trade is implicated in the blame around dieback in 
that a significant element of media articles initially focussed on the governmental failure to 
institute an import ban on ash trees and saplings, which had been called for as early as 2009 
(Heuch 2014). Hence, exploring the broader and historical field of articles with which dieback 
is connected reveals the dimensions of a blame frame13 taking shape before 2009. We explore 
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this frame by focussing on the tree pathogen, ramorum, and the pest, OPM, before turning to 
dieback.  
Ramorum and blame 
Unlike dieback, blame was not explicit around ramorum in early articles about it. Initially, it 
was reported that the UK could ban timber imports from the USA, but not from EU countries 
because existing trade regulations prevented this14. The cause of ramorum as originating 
elsewhere was explicit in that ‘two of the diseased viburnum samples found at British nurseries 
were from the Netherlands’15, but lacked direct implication of governmental failure. This is in 
contrast to the immediate and explicit framing of the ingress of H. fraxineus. In December 2003 
the ‘Dutch [were] blamed for oak disease’16. By 2004, blame had crystallised, for example, in 
how ‘suspicion has fallen upon the Far East, with infected plants entering the UK via the 
booming trade in international plants’17 and ‘these blights are so successful because the 
international horticulture trade has introduced new pathogens to new hosts’, i.e. a frame was 
emerging where blame could be apportioned to external sources. In this sense, it is interesting 
to reflect on the significance of blaming ‘global trade’ and the original site of TPP in terms of 
displacement. Positing the origin of the problem in ‘the Far East’, for example, can be thought 
of as displacing blame via a process of ‘othering’ and the subordination of other cultures 
(Maestas et al. 2008; Wachs et al. 2012), fitting with the broader framing of dieback as an 
existential threat seeking to breach UK borders. Blaming ‘global trade’ is also a process of 
displacement whereby the individuals and organisations responsible for and enacting global 
trade are rendered abstract, in contrast to work which suggests that blame and responsibility 
framings in the media are often apportioned to individuals or organisations (Holton et al. 2012).   
From the outset, a significant attribution made by the media concerned the uncertainty about 
where ramorum would spread, what it was likely to effect and the implications for nurseries. 
This uncertainty connected to implicit blame in that media articles explained how budget cuts 
were reducing the ability of scientists to correctly identify pathogenic species: ‘no money to 
investigate differences between the European and American [ramorum]’18. An article from 
May 2002 included the moral evaluation that ‘lack of money is damaging one vital group of 
specialist researchers who […] guard the biodiversity of the planet’19. Both a lack of funding 
and a lack of uptake on undergraduate plant pathology courses was seen as leading to a decline 
in the number of expert plant pathologists. Ten years later in 2012, the issue of plant pathology 
and funding manifested as a point of contention in the media with headlines repackaging the 
problem, this time as a solution for dieback: ‘Research will keep Britain's trees healthy.’20 
Overall, the blame frame around ramorum not only incorporated proximal issues, such as plant 
imports, but also historical issues re-rendered, such as funding cuts in plant pathology training.  
In summary, and in relation the question of how were other tree health issues re-presented in 
light of dieback, the issue of infected imports and blame was implicit early on but only 
crystallised later. Moreover, ramorum articles also raised the issue of funding and plant 
pathology research, reflecting the uncertainty in identifying the pathogen responsible for 
dieback. By the time dieback emerged in 2012, the blame frame around dieback was inevitable 
and represented a good fit for dieback, given the history of issues that informed it.  
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OPM and blame 
Explicit and directed blame for the arrival of OPM when it first appeared in the UK in 2006 
was not a feature of media coverage. It was reported that ‘Britain's policies are based on trade 
so it does not often ban imports [since there is] no requirement for anybody to control the 
moth.’21 The first explicit mention of blame occurs in 2007 when OPM is conflated with grey 
squirrels and DED, with a causal reasoning such that ‘both could have been eradicated if the 
authorities of the day had done a better job early on.’22 A further aspect of blame around OPM 
was the entanglement between the import trade and climate change. OPM appears with climate 
change in thirty nine articles; fourteen of these also included dieback. OPM is depicted as 
arriving in the UK under its own volition ‘after hitching a ride from Italy on some trees bound 
for a nursery.’23 However, articles made it clear that the ability of OPM to gain a foothold in 
the UK reflected a more conducive climate caused by global warming. According to the FC 
pest risk analysis for OPM, climate change is regarded as increasing OPM’s range, as is the 
trade in trees for instant landscaping. This ‘official’ information about OPM conveys the same 
themes as media coverage and is the type of resource journalists draw on. In 2002, climate 
change is suggested as one cause for the increasing prevalence of TPP in the UK. The causal 
centrality of climate change is firmly established in 2009: ‘the reasons for [pathogens] sudden 
arrival are complex but one single factor stands out: climate change.’24 This suggests that the 
reality and the representation of environmental issues consist of interconnected challenges 
(Byhring and Knain 2016), i.e. the entanglement of trade and climate change.  These became 
dimensions of the blame frame around dieback.  
In summary and in relation the question of how were other tree health issues re-presented in 
light of dieback, blame was not explicitly attributed to oak imports bringing OPM into the UK 
when it first arrived in 2006. One year later OPM had been conflated with other threats and the 
similar claim of governmental failure to act sooner, which eventually became a major 
attribution around dieback, transforming OPM in the process to an existential threat and not 
the ‘hairy invader’ of early depictions. 
Dieback and blame 
When dieback emerged as an object of media attention in late 2012 a blame frame rapidly took 
shape reflecting government inaction with regards the failure to implement a precautionary ash 
import ban (Fellenor et al. 2017; Tomlinson 2016) . An attribution of responsibility framing is 
a common feature of news, especially in relation to crisis events (An and Gower 2009). This 
was the case with dieback, with explicit responsibility aimed at the UK Government having 
crystallised by mid-October: ‘When the danger was first identified three years ago, the 
government response was that the disease was already too widespread to stop’25 and ‘if ash 
dieback spreads through Britain, Cameron's administration will be solely to blame.’26 
According to (Holton et al. 2012), the media may be expected to suggest who is responsible 
for solving issues and this was also apparent, although often entangled with responsibility; ‘The 
Government is finally acting decisively against ash dieback disease – why not sooner?’27 Blame 
also drew in different aspects of Government involvement, ‘Growers blame spread of ash 
dieback on 'chaotic' grants’28 and delegated blame to other organisations: ‘the problem lies with 
[…] with nurseries, and consumers, not caring about the provenance of the plants.’29 
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By late 2012, media coverage of other tree health issues and their convergence with climate 
change and global imports had for several years been acting to sensitise the media, setting the 
scene for some of the major attributions of blame around dieback. We conceptualise this not in 
terms of a linear and punctuated hazard sequence, but as a continual evolution involving a 
broader field of proximal and distal media issues. In terms of the causal reasoning which 
framing is predicated on, this means extending our analytic lens both ‘synchronically’ and 
‘diachronically’, to understand the scope of an event. We can think of this in terms of the 
various dimensions of the blame frame having travelled through media articles involving, for 
example OPM and ramorum, across time. Hence, the blame that evolved around dieback is 
multidimensional and can be traced historically via existing tree health issues but also 
encompasses other phenomena that were also apparent from our reading of media articles. 
These included the aborted forest sell-off in England, foot and mouth disease, BSE, and human 
migration. For example, foot and mouth disease is used in relation to dieback to anchor earlier 
failures in biosecurity. It is also used to frame ramorum in terms of an example of ‘locking the 
stable door once the horse has bolted’30; i.e. the need for specific biosecurity practices for tree 
workers and the model of the Defra operation to identify and destroy infected trees.  
A blame frame as a field was evolving many years before dieback. This is one aspect of 
thinking about dieback as a dispersed risk event which crystallised in this field during an era 
when the nature of the traditional media, in conjunction with publics empowered by new 
communication technologies, was transforming towards playing an even more active role in 
the political arena (Callon et al. 2009; Chadwick 2017). Dieback can be thought of as 
contributing to a policy shift in the domain of tree health and this is more clearly understood if 
the historical and broader media context is taken into account. The mass media increasingly 
play a role in identifying disasters and providing a forum for converting local incidents into 
national scandals (Martin and Evans 1984), which brings us back to the role of blame. From 
this perspective, blame is part of the fabric of reporting disastrous events, rather than 
necessarily being particular to dieback in itself. In this sense it was inevitable that blame would 
figure in the framing of dieback. The role of the government for not instituting an import ban 
can be thought about as the frame ‘surface’, which is predicated on and yet occludes, or black-
box’s, the broader aspects of how the frame has evolved via issues such as TPP such as OPM. 
In summary, figure 3, below, provides a timeline illustrating the specific tree pests and diseases 
(TPD) in the newspaper articles we explored and their respective key framings at different 
points across time. As discussed above and of note is the convergence of individual TPD 
toward a general threat, ongoing anchoring with global warming and the problematisation of 
plant imports. 
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Figure 3. Timeline illustrating specific tree pests and diseases (TPD) in newspaper articles and key framings across 
time.  
Conclusion and implications  
In this paper, we have presented a frame analysis of media articles about dieback and have 
considered the implications of thinking about dieback as a dispersed risk event for the SARF. 
Key findings are, firstly, that with the advent of dieback we witnessed in the media a modest 
proliferation of articles about other tree pests and pathogens. We suggest that this proliferation 
was a result of other tree-health issues being drawn into dieback stories as a means of 
establishing the broader frames through which dieback could be reported. Secondly, many 
articles post-dieback represented a general threat of invasion to the UK from an amalgam of 
both plant and animal species. Dieback was substantiated through these other threats, with their 
own trajectories in the media, and this blurs the boundaries when thinking about dieback as an 
event in itself. Hence, exploring the broader field of tree-health issues that the media have 
attended to over recent years enables an understanding of the evolution of the blame frame 
around dieback, and how attributions such as governmental failure came about. Thirdly, as an 
amalgamated threat, individual TPP such as OPM and ramorum were re-presented such that 
they lost aspects of their individual character and original framing.  
In relation to the hazard sequence, it is useful to reflect on how dieback has affected the 
reporting of tree health issues in general. A change in the hazard template appears to be that 
tree health issues are now firmly framed as only part of a broader existential threat, which 
includes animals and other plants. I.e. the threat posed by any single invasive species is less 
salient than what ‘invasion’ signifies in general. Moreover, it is also interesting to consider 
how the hazard templates around tree health issues may continue to evolve or whether in fact 
there is nothing new to add. What kind of risk event might now further stretch and transform 
the template? For example, whilst we encountered a few articles about emerald ash borer, 
when, or if, this tree pest reaches the UK, will we witness the same degree of media attention 
as was afforded ash dieback and, if so, how will it be framed? This provides scope for future 
work.  
In relation to our aim of exploring the notion of ‘dispersed’ risk events, thinking about dieback 
as an ‘event’ in itself means that the policy shifts around it involve a broader, historical field 
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of other issues and concerns easily forgotten or obscured. It is important to maintain the 
visibility of different actors and the various epistemic positions they represent (Rip 2003). On 
the other hand, some convergence of ideas is necessary so that different audiences can access 
them. This alludes to the manner in which the framing process necessarily re-renders historical 
occurrences. It is important to appreciate that in this re-rendering there may be a tendency to 
overlook that history involves a continual processes of construction, contestation and 
reification; that historical events are only unproblematic as a ‘surface’ or outcome. For the 
policymaking process, we suggest that it is important to bear in mind that past events will be 
drawn on, re-rendered and enrolled in the construction and framing of present events. Hence, 
recognising the historical and dispersed nature of risk events has important implications for 
policymaking. Where the construction of an event evolves over a period of time, representing 
it as discrete and bounded and failing to appreciate how it is dispersed in relation to previous 
issues, policymakers may well find themselves having to address the challenge that previous 
action - or inaction – may have contributed to the situation at hand.  
Exploring dieback from within [historical] media articles enabled us to step back from dieback 
as an object and to consider how its attributes could be traced back through other tree-health 
issues and actors; metaphorically bracketing off the ‘eventness’ of dieback. Journalists recourse 
to media templates when interpreting and presenting new events (Kitzinger 2000; 2004). Risk 
perception can be similarly influenced by sequential hazard notifications, most usually via the 
media and which also form part of a template by which risk perception is schematised (Barnett 
and Breakwell 2003). One aspect of the templates used by journalists is their use of current 
events as evidence of an underlying persistent problem (Kitzinger 2000; 2004). From this 
viewpoint, the media attention to dieback can be thought of as representing existing problems 
in a translated form.  
In relation to risk events and SARF, amplification results from a physical event or the 
recognition of an adverse effect interacting with psychological, social, institutional, and 
cultural processes and heightening perceptions of risk and shaping risk behaviour. For a risk 
event, such as dieback, we suggest that the metaphor of amplification does not apply in the 
same way that it might to a more discrete event. Indeed, for public concern to develop around 
a potential risk issue, a discrete and initiating event such as an accident or disaster pertaining 
to the risk is not a necessary condition for concern to develop; as (Mazur 2016) outlines, with 
regard to the anti-fracking movement in the US. If, as we have attempted to demonstrate, the 
event in question can be thought of as a composite of historical concerns, then what is 
amplified, or attended to by the media in the present is the culmination of a long-standing if 
not ongoing process, rather than an immediate and localised response. The ‘ripple’ metaphor 
does not adequately capture this.  We do not suggest that dispersed risk events differ in 
qualitative terms as such, but that it is instead a question of intensities and scale and that there 
is value in thinking about amplification as a continual process. As noted by Pidgeon and Barnett 
(2013, p. 3) ‘lessons can be learned from the ways in which [such] risk issues develop, are 
handled and communicated.’ It is important to keep visible the history around an event because 
assuming that risk events have a clear-cut beginning doesn’t do justice to the social, cultural 
and political contexts within which the event occurs and is made meaningful by such contexts; 
contexts which are themselves subsequently re-shaped by the event.  
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The risk events SARF-inspired studies have addressed tend to be spatially and temporally 
localised. Our analysis has demonstrated the value in allowing the analytic focus to incorporate 
more of the history of a risk event and viewing it as potentially blurred, socially, temporally 
and spatially diffuse and constructed from historical issues but always with the media providing 
a common infrastructure that gives ‘publicity to positions and controversies’ (Callon et al. 
2009, p. 181). Considering events as dispersed and historically mediated in this way recognises 
the dynamic and fluid nature of social relations and risk objects and will help mitigate against 
a view of policy acting on a world where relations are static, inherently stable and hence 
incommensurate with reality.  
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Notes 
 
1 We use ‘dieback’ to designate the attention to, and consequences of H. fraxineus’, ingress to the UK, 
2 H. fraxineus had not been identified until 2006 (Timmermann et al. 2011). 
3 Search terms, developed by reading extant literature, were (ash AND dieback) OR chalara OR (chalara AND 
ash) OR (chalara AND dieback) OR hymenoscyphus OR fraxineus. Duplicates were grouped. 
4 Prior to 2012 there had been no systematic surveillance for dieback in the UK (Sansford 2013), although the FC 
had been aware of the risk from dieback since 2008 and had discussed with the European Commission Plant 
Health Standing Committee whether an import ban might be necessary (HCDEB 2012). Given ambiguity with 
regard to the characterisation of the disease, specifically scientific confusion over the identification of the causal 
organism, it was assumed that dieback was related to the already endemic H. albidus. Hence imposing a ban would 
not be justified or be possible under EU law. 
5 Ramorum was first identified on nursery-grown rhododendron and viburnum in Germany and the Netherlands 
in 1993, and in 1995 on tanoaks (Lithocarpus densiflorus) and oaks in California (Vercauteren et al. 2011). It 
affects a range of plants, causing extensive damage or mortality. Many plants act as a host for the organism. In 
the UK, ramorum was first found in in 2002 and initially considered a threat to horticultural shrubs and native 
oaks. However, it later caused widespread mortality in commercial Japanese larch plantations. The first UK 
ramorum article appeared on January 11 2002 in response to its effects in California.  
6 OPM has been identified in practically all European countries and parts of the Middle East. OPM larvae pose a 
low level threat to human health via the immune response caused by exposure to the caterpillar’s urticating hairs. 
(Rahlenbeck and Utikal 2015). The threat to oak trees arises through the caterpillars eating the leaves, leaving 
trees weakened and susceptible to attack from other pests. Media articles about OPM first appear in 2006. It was 
first identified in the UK on 20 imported fastigiate oaks (Quercus robur ‘Fastigiata’) planted in the car park of a 
housing development in Richmond. 
7 HCLM, first reported in Wimbledon in 2002 and subsequently spreading to most of England and Wales, causes 
extensive damage to horse chestnut tree leaves due to the sheer number of larvae, often resulting in leaves turning 
brown by mid-summer. (Pocock and Evans 2014). However, HCLM alone does not kill trees nor significantly 
affect their overall health. 
8 EAB is highly destructive to ash trees. While invasive in Europe and Northwest America, EAB is not yet present 
in the UK. 
9 GSBB damages and weakens trees when its larvae, laid under the bark, feed on the inner, woody layers.  
According to the FC, GSBB was accidentally introduced into the UK, most likely on timber, in 1982 and is now 
established in Wales and Western England. 
10 Observer, 25.11.2012 
11 Daily Telegraph, 9.1.2010 
12 Times, 3.11.2012 
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13 A search of co-occurrence of ‘dieback’ with ‘blame’ or ‘responsibility’ or ‘responsible’ produced 117 articles. 
Given that the term ‘blame’ can be used in a rhetorical or literal manner, we did not assume that all 117 articles 
related to blame frames per se and instead used them to guide our reading and further searches. 
14 Daily Mail, 4.5.2002 
15 Daily Mail, 4.5.2002 
16 Times, 8.12.2003 
17 Guardian, 9.5.2004 
18 Times, 23.5.2002 
19 Times, 23.5.2002 
20 Times, 3.11.2012 
21 Daily Telegraph, 14.10.2006 
22 Daily Telegraph, 3.8.2007 
23 Daily Mail, 14.10.2006 
24 Sunday Times, 8.3.2009 
25 Times 28.10.2012 
26 Guardian 23.10.2012 
27 Telegraph 29.10.2012 
28 Guardian 2.11.2012 
29 Times 2.11 2012 
30 Times, 24.2.2004 
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